Sunday, April 26, 2015

Featured

Bile

Muqdisho(Bartamaha)Weeraryahanka kooxda Saxafi iyo xulka qaranka Soomaaliya, ayaa booska
loo beddeli doona, kaddib markii uu xulka dhaawac kaga haray da’yarka
Maxamuud Cabdinuur Maxamed (Meeman).
Xiddiga heerka caalami ee Bile, ayaa markii ugu horeeysay xulka waxa
uu u dheeli doona lambarka toddobaadk, halkii uu ka duullaan tagi
jiray weerarka ayuu maanta ka dagaal gelli doona garabka.
Meeman, ayaa waxa uu ahaa lambarka toddobaad ee xulka qaranka
Soomaaliya, waxana uu ciyaaryahankan dhaawac seedka la kulmay kulan
naadigiisa Jeenyo ay la qaadatay Somali Friut, taas oo keentay inuu ka
haro xulka.
Bile, ayaa waxa uu ka mid yahay xiddigaha Ocean Stars ee galabta ka
horjeedo dhigooda Rwanda.
W/D: Maxamed Shuuriye Nuur (Barakaat)

27-300x169

Muqdisho(Bartamaha)Guud ahaan halka soomaalida ay dagto waxa ay isticmaalaan Xooga Dameerka hadana waxa ay u isticmaalaan si kabaxsan xuquuqda nafsada Xayawaanka .

Dameerku Waa noole u baahan in la ixtiraamo Culumaduna waxa ay sheegaan in Qiyaamaha la isweeydiin doono sida aad ula dhaqanto.

hoos ka daawo Sawiro qaabka xad dhaafka ah oo ay u isticmaalaan Soomaalida Dameerka.

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

CCC

Nairobi, April 23, 2015

Somalia’s prime minister warned Thursday that the conflict in Yemen poses dangers across the Gulf of Aden where an influx of refugees is stretching scarce resources and Al-Qaeda militants are eager for support.

More than 2,000 refugees have so far arrived in the northern Somali regions of Puntland and Somaliland, with the UN refugee agency preparing to receive as many as 100,000 in the coming months.Those fleeing the fighting are a mixture of Yemenis and Somalis.

“Our economy cannot support this influx of refugees,” Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke told AFP during a visit to the Kenyan capital Nairobi on Thursday.”We need a lot of support to accommodate these refugees,” said Sharmarke, whose country has itself suffered from decades of civil war.

In the south of Somalia Al-Qaeda-aligned Shebab militants still hold sway in much of the countryside, despite being pushed out of most towns by a coalition of African Union and Somali troops. A string of militant leaders have also been killed in US drone strikes.

Sharmarke said “there’s a debate” within Shebab over whether to switch allegiance to Islamic State. But he warned that the strengthening of Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), which has long had ties to Shebab and has taken advantage of Yemen’s strife to seize new territory, could benefit the Somali group.

The prime minister warned that Al-Qaeda operatives from Yemen could use the cover of fleeing refugees to infiltrate Somalia and called for stringent screening of new arrivals as well as a renewed regional effort to defeat Shebab.

“There’s a real sense of urgency for us in the region to quickly shut down the Jubba corridor,” said Sharmarke, referring to a riverine area in southern Somalia where Shebab fighters are concentrated. “Shebab is not a local issue but a regional one,” said Sharmarke. The group struck Uganda in 2010 and has attacked Kenya repeatedly, most recently killing 148 people at Garissa University earlier this month.

Referring to international coalitions currently fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Sharmarke said, “There has to be a regional solution to Shebab.” Sharmarke, who has both Somali and Canadian citizenship, was named prime minister in December, the second time he held the position.

 

download (1)

Muqdisho(Bartamaha)Degmooyinka Kaxda iyo Dayniile ayaa shalay galab kulan kuwada qaatay garoonka lagu ciyaaro tartanka futsalka ee degmada Howlwadaag , labada degmo ayaa qeyb ka ah degmooyinka ka qeyb galaya tartanka Futsalka

waxaana labada degmo ay soo bandhigeyn ciyaara aad loo jecleysto waxaana qeybtii hore ee ciyaarta lagu kala nastay 3-1 ay hogaanka ku hayaan wiilasha degamada Dayniile.
Qeybtii labaada ee ciyaarta degmada Kaxda ayaa waxa ay soo bandhigtay ciyaar aad ugu wangsaneed qeybtii hore ka dib markii wiilashandegmaad Kaxda ay abuureyn fursado badan ay iskaga soo gudeyn goolashii lagu lahaa balse degmada Kaxda ayaa qeybtii labaad ee ciyaarta ka fursado badneed wiilasha degmada Dayniile, waxaana ciyaarta waqtigii loogu talagalay ay ku soo idlaatay 3-1 ay guusha ku racaady wiilasha degamada Kaxda, degmada Dayniile ayaa 26-04-2015 waxa ay la
ciyaaridoona wiilasha degamada Dharkenley oo guul ka soo gaaray degamada Shingaani, halka wiilasha degamada Kaxda ay la ciyaaridoonaan 28-04-2015 wiilasha degamad Shingaani oo guul daro ka soo gaartay degamada Dharkenley.
Isla garoonka ayaa marti geliyay kulankii labaad waxaana kuwada ciyaaray degmooyinka Dharkenley iyo Shingaani , waxaana ciyaarta labada degmo u soo daawasho tagay masuuliyiinta isboortiga labada degmo iyo taageerayaal aad u soo buuxdhaafiyay oo ka kala yimid labada degmo.
Waxaana ciyaarta ay ku bilaawaatay dardar xoogan iyo xiflaatan dheere ah balse qeybtii hore ee ciyaarta ayaa lagu kala nastay 1-1 ama barabaro.
Qeybtii labaad ee ciyarata wiilasha Shingaani ayaa waxa ay iska lumiyeen fursado badan oo loo filan karay goolal , balse wiialsha Dharkenley ayaa fursadihii ay iska lumiyeen degamada Shingaani ka faa idaysateyn waxaana ciyaarta ay ku soo gebagebaday 4-1 ay guuasha ku racaady wiilasha degamada Dharkenley, wilasha Dahrkenley ayaa kulankii labaad oo xariir ka gaaray tartanka Futsalka degmooyinka gobalka Banadir, Dharkenley ayaa 26-04-2015 waxa ay la ciayaaridoonaan
wiilasha degamada Dayniile oo guul daro wata, halka degamada Shingaani ay 28-04-2015 la ciyaardoona wiilasha Kaxad oo guul ka soo gaaraty degamada Dayniile.
Galabata ayaa lagu wadaa in garoonka ay ka dhacaan kulamo ka tirsan tartanka Futsalak degmooyinka Gobalka Bandir kulanka hore waxaa wada ciyaaridoona Waaberi iyo Xamar JaJab, Waaberi ayaa 7-6 kaga soo adkaatay degamada Howlwadaag, halka Xamara JaJaba ay 4-2 kaga soo adkaadeyn wiilasha Warta Nabad, kulanka labaad ee galabta waxaa wada balansan martigeliyaasha tartanka ee Howlwaad iyo Warta Nabada labada degmada ayaa guul daro kala soo kulamay Waaberi iyo Xamar JaJab.
W/D: Maxamed Xuseen Qalinle
Email:qalinle39@gamail.com

Lamaanaha-Dhabta-ah-150x150

Muqdisho(Bartamaha)quburro udhashay dalka mareykanka ayaa xaqiijiyay in isu muuqashada lamaanaha is jcl keeni karto in lakala xiiso bogto meeeshaasna uu jclku kufashilmo.

caashaqa kadhex jira lamaanaha ayaa markasta laga ilaaliyaa dhaawac iyo saaameyn jcl balse arintan ayaa kunoqoneysa mid lama filaan ah iyadoo ey dhaawaci karto jiritaaanka iyo sii socoshada jclka.

Quburro u dhashay Dalka Hindiya oo la sheego in uu yahay wadan ku hormaray dhanka jaceylka ayaa Maanta shaaciyay in ay tahay dhibaato is raga lamaanaha si joogto ah.

Waxa ay sheegeen in bur bur joogto ah lagala kulmayo lamaanaha is jecel ee waqti waliba is arka oo wada kulma.

Laamanaha waa in ay isku xiisaan dabeetana ay kulmaan sidaasi ayaa kor loogu qaadi karaa jaceylka lamaanayashaa is jecel.

Ugu yaraan waa in lamaanayaashu ay kala maqnaadaan muddo 3 bari ah ama ka badan si ay isugu xiisaan laakiin kawaran haddii lamaanayaashu ay isla joogaan waqti kasta.

Quburada jaceylka qaarkood ayaa aaminsan fikir ka duwan kaasi qaarkood waxa ay leeyiheen wanaaga jaceylka ayaa waxa ay ku jiraa in la badiyo kulamada oo laga dhigo kuwo joogto ah.

Al Jazeera

Filmmaker: Mohammad Omar

Since 1991, after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, a civil war in Somalia has triggered a steady exodus from the country that continues today.

Somalis regularly flee to Yemen which has had an open door policy towards them since the war began.

They travel by sea, in vessels they call “boats of death,” because their journeys are fraught with danger: They are at the mercy of people smugglers who charge around $100 a head to take them across the Gulf of Aden. If they are spotted by the Yemeni coastguard, the smugglers might even throw passengers overboard to save their own skins. And the oversized boats often capsize.

Once in Yemen, many of the refugees make their way to Kharaz refugee camp which, with its population of around 17,000, cannot accommodate the Somali refugees who now number 240,000, according to UN estimates.

Somali refugees in Yemen face an uncertain, often dangerous, future. They often live in poverty, struggle to find work, face discrimination and can fall victim to human trafficking.

For those who want to escape Yemen for Saudi Arabia, people smugglers will try and intervene and have been known to abduct and torture refugees. Since 2011, human traffickers have turned homes into “smugglers’ yards” where they imprison and torture Somalis. Even though the Yemeni authorities have closed down some “yards”, they invariably re-open in other districts.

In this film, we hear the stories of refugees at Kharaz refugee camp and others in Sanaa trying to start a new life in the city. We speak to the aid agencies and officials; and we track down and confront the human smugglers who kidnap and abuse the vulnerability of refugees whose families can face ransom demands.

Now, with Yemen embroiled in fresh internal conflict and cutting humanitarian aid, the UN can only afford to do the bare minimum. Some Somalis want to return home but the UN cannot send them back to a war zone. Unless the refugees can find their own way out of the country, they will remain trapped indefinitely in Yemen.

Premier Bank will soon start distributing Mastercard-administered debit and prepaid cards to customers, and it plans to have 15,000 cards issued by the end of 2015.

Reuters

DUBAI – Somalia’s Premier Bank has struck a deal with Mastercard and will issue debit cards and install ATM machines in the capital of the war-ravaged country, the Islamic lender’s top executive said on Wednesday.

The east African nation has struggled for more than two decades with civil war and containing an insurrection by Islamist militants which has meant even basic infrastructure has been beyond most of the country’s 10 million people.

Yet with al Shabaab militants driven out of the capital Mogadishu and other major strongholds, business and consumer demand has grown for services which would be taken for granted in many other parts of the world, including banking.

“Somalia is a very under-penetrated market with less than 3 percent of its population banked,” Mahat Mohamed Ahmed, managing director of Premier Bank, which received a licence from the central bank last year, told Reuters in Dubai.

Carrying local currency in Somalia, a de facto dollarized economy, is cumbersome as $1 is worth 21,000 Somali shillings, and the only note in circulation is 1,000 shillings. For wealthier Somalis and visiting foreigners, carrying cash can be a dangerous task in cities rife with crime and awash with guns.

Ahmed said in an interview that the Islamic lender, one of a handful of banks in Somalia, will soon start distributing Mastercard-administered debit and prepaid cards to customers. It plans to have 15,000 cards issued by the end of 2015 and says its ATM machines will also accept cards issued abroad.

MasterCard’s spokeswoman for Africa said it had licensed Premier Bank to go live with their cards and machines.

MOBILE MONEY

However, Somali banks may struggle to convince the local population to sign up to debit cards, which might charge for withdrawals, as most Somalis use ubiquitous cheap, or free, mobile money technology to pay for goods and services.

Premier has bought five ATM machines and will install them in various locations with high security in Mogadishu, Ahmed said. With a withdrawal limit of $1,000 a day, the cards can be used online and abroad.

Salaam Somali Bank installed the sole ATM in Somalia in an upmarket hotel in Mogadishu last year. However, central bank sources and hotel visitors say it does not work.

Salaam did not respond to requests for comment.

Creating a banking system from scratch is proving problematic for Somalia. The U.S. terms al Qaeda-aligned al Shabaab a “terrorist organisation” and this has raised concerns in international banking about the risk of fines if money channelled through them ends up in the hands of the militants.

Premier has one of Somalia’s four registered SWIFT codes but Somali lenders are struggling to build networks of correspondent banks for cross-border transactions due to fears about money-laundering and terrorist financing.

“Anti-money laundering is a huge issue for dealing with international banks. They don’t want to deal with Somali banks,” Ahmed said.

Somalis have traditionally dealt with informal and unregulated money transfer firms. But these money transfer firms that send much of diaspora remittances to Somalia are also struggling as correspondent banks shut their accounts, driven by the same worries about funding militant groups.

Yet despite all the challenges, Ahmed believes the security improvements in Somalia have heralded huge business opportunities: “(It) has encouraged Somalis overseas to come back and invest in the country.” 

(Additional reporting by Abdi Sheikh in Mogadishu and Drazen Jorgic in Nairobi; Editing by David French, Drazen Jorgic and David Clarke)

m207-660x467

Muqdisho(Bartmaha)Waxaa xaley la ciyaarey kulamo ka tirsan champions league-ga oo loogu soo baxaayo wareega semi-finalka koobkaan.

Kooxihii xaley is wajahey waxa eey kala ahaayeen Barcelona iyo PSG, laakiin kulankii cajiibka ahaa waxa uu dhex marey kooxaha Buyern Muchen iyo FC Port, waxaana meesha ka baxey rajadii kooxda FC Port0 eey ka laheyd wareega semi-finalka ee champions league-ga.

Barcelona 2 – 0 PSG

Goolasha: 14, 34 Neymar,

Cel celiska Labadii kulan Barcelona 5 – 1 PSG

Buyern Muchen 6 – 1 FC Porto

Buyern Muchen

Goolasha: 14 Thiago, 22  Boateng, 27 Lewandowski, 36 Mueller, 40 Lewandowski, 88 Xabi Alonso.

FC Porto

74 Jackson Martinez.

Barcelona iyo Buyern Muchen ayaan sidaas ugu soo gudbey wareega semi-finalka ee champions league-ga.

m3

m

m6

m1

m5

m9

 

Hurdada-150x150

Muqdisho (Bartamaha)

Cilmi baarayaal ka socda ururka hurdada Mareykanka ayaa sheegaya inay jiraan baahiyo kala duwan oo hurdada ah oo ay qabaan koox da’aad kasta, sidaa daraadeedna adiga waa intee baahidaada hurdo?

Inta badan dadka waa ay yaqaanaan marka aysan helin hurdo aan ku filneyn balse imise ayaa ku filan qofka? Cilmi baarista dhawaan ay Mareykanka sameeyeen ayaa sheegeysa in jawaabta ay ku xiran tahay da’ada.

Joogteyn la’aanta waqtiga hurdada, waxyaabaha kiciya jirka sida qaxwaha, cabitaanada awoodda keena, saacadaha lagu kaco iyo iftiinka maalinti ayaa ah waxyaabo dhammaan wax ka badala wareegga loo yaqaano saacadda jirka.

Ururka hurdada Mareykanka oo ah urur gargaar oo deggan Virginia ayaa sheegaya in nolosha shaqsiyadeed ee qofka ay fure u tahay fahamka baahida hurdo inkastoo ay jiraan talooyin badan iyadoo la fiirinayo inta aad jirto.

Caruurta marka ay dhashaan ilaa 3 bilood ayey tahay inay hurdaan inta u dhaxeysa 14 ilaa 17 saacadood maalin kasta. Waxaa kaloo la sheegayaa in 11 ilaa 13 saacadood ay ku filan tahay. Laguma taliyo in wax ka badan 19 saacadood uu jiifo cunugga.

Caruurta u dhaxeysa 4 ilaa 11 bilood ayey tahay inay hurdaan 12 ilaa 15 saacadood. Saacadda ugu yar oo ay tahay inay hurdaan ayaa ah 10 saacadood, mana ahan inay hurdaan wax ka badan 18 saacadood.

Hal ilaa labo jir caruurta ahna, waa inay hurdaan inta u dhaxeysa 11 ilaa 14 saacadood, waana hurdi karaan 9 ilaa 16 saacadood.

Kuwa ka yar da’ada dugsiyada oo jira 3 ilaa 5 sano ayey tahay inay hurdaan 10 ilaa 13 saacadood. In ka yar 8 saacadood ama ka badan 14 saacadood ma haboona inay hurdaan.

Caruurta dugsiyda ku jira oo u dhaxeeya 6 ilaa 13 sano ayaa lagu taliyay inay hurdaan 9 ilaa 11 saacadood. Wixii ka yar 7 saacadood ama ka badan 12 uma wanaagsana caafimaadkooda.

Kuwa jira 14 ilaa 17 waxaa lagu taliyaa inay hurdaan 8 ilaa 10 saacadood, waxaana laga digay hurdada 11 saac ka badan iyo midda ka yar 7 saacadood.

Dhalinyarada da’adoodu u dhexeysa 18 ilaa 25 ayey tahay inay hurdaan inta u dhaxeysa 7 ilaa 9 saacadood balse wixii ka yar 6 ama ka badan 11 ayeysan habooneyn.

Dadka waaweyn ee u dhexeeya 26 ilaa 64 ayaa iyana la mid ah dhalinyarada halka kuwa jira 65 iyo wixii ka weyn ay caafimaad u tahay inay hurdaan 7 ilaa 8 saacadood maalinkii. Waxaana lagu taliyay inaysan hurdin wax ka yar 5 saacadood ama ka badan 9 saacadood.

Qubarada hurdada ee ururka NSF ayaa daabacay talooyin dhowr ah oo kor loogu qaadayo tayada hurdada. Waxaana ka mid ah in ugu horeyn laga dhigo midda ugu horeysa hurada. Talooyinkooda waxaa ka mid ah:

In la joogteeyo jadwalka hurdada xitaa hadii ay tahay maalmaha fasaxa.

In la sameeyo waqti sariirta lagu nasto.

In la hubiyo heerkulka, dhawaaqa iyo iftiinka qolka jiifka.

In lagu hurdo joodari iyo barkin raaxo ah.

Ka fogow waxa hurdada xada sida waxa jirka kiciya.

Iska dami qalabka elektaroonikada ka hor jiifka.

download (1)

Dowlada Federaalka ah ee Soomaaliya  ayaa waxaa laga Dalbaday in ay Si Deg deg ah  Maxkamadda Usoo Taagto  Hogaamiyaha Maamulka raaskambooni Axmed Maxamed Islaam Axmed madoobe 
Dahir Amiin Jeesoow ayaa Waxaa Dowlada Federaalka ah ee Soomaaliya ku Dhaliilay in ay Calanka u Luleeyso Xasuuqda Baahsan Ee maamulka Raaskambooni  uu ka wado Magaalada Kismaayo ee xarunta gobolka jubada Hoose

Magaalada kismaayo Waxaa Aalaaba laga soo Wariyaa ruux la dilay oo lag helay xeebta gurigiisana lagala baxay taasi oo marar qaar sheekooyin badan mugdi galineeyso  Cidamada maamulka Jubba yo Kuwa kenya ayaana Eedaasi Dusha looga Tuuraa

Falalka Qayaxan ee Ka Dhaco Kismaayo Wali laMa’arag Ruux oo loo Qabtay Taas iyana Waaa Su’aal Jawaab u Baahan oo Mudan in la weeydiiyo Hogaamiyaha Raaskamboonyiinta Axmed Madoobe Iyo Xulufadiisa

Kenya iyo Ethopia ayaa la sheegaa in ay Xasuuqa Axmed Madoobe Garab ku Siyaan Dadka Qaar ayaa Waxaa ay sheegayaa in beello gaar a beegsanaayo taas oo Dhuun Qabad u ah Xasil Ku Noolaanshaha Dadka


Xildhibaan Dahir Amiin Jeesow oo ah Guddoomiye kuxigenka Guddiga Arrimaha Gudaha iyo Baarlamaanka Soomaaliya , ayaa ku eedeeyay in  Axmed Madoobe dhibaato ku hayo bulshada ku dhaqan Gobolada Jubooyinka ayna Ciidamada Kismaayo ka wadaan gabood falo.

Daahir Amiin Jeesoow ayaa waxaa uu sheegay in ayna Aqbali Doonin Xildhibaano ay soo Xuleen gabra iyo Maxamed Cabdi Afeey Waxuu sheegay in uu yahay Xildhibaan  Kana Aqbaleeyn Axmed Madoobe waxa uu kismaayo ka wado

Audio clip: Adobe Flash Player (version 9 or above) is required to play this audio clip. Download the latest version here. You also need to have JavaScript enabled in your browser.


Beesha Caalamka ayuu Weeydiiyay  in ay suura gal tahay in indha laga laabto Arimaha Kismaayo ay ka wadaan Axmed madoobeGabra iyo Maxamed Cabd Affeey

 
 Hadalka daahir Amiin Jeeoow ayaa waxaa uu imanayaa  Xili kismaayo laga soo Warinaayo Falal Gadoob Fal ah  oo ay Geeysanayaan Maamulka Axmed madoobe
Waxaan kusoo Idleeynayaa Hadalka Kadeedka Kismaayo Ee Kukunyo,Kambooni,Gabra iyo Afeey  Goormuu Idlaan

Al Jazeera

At least ten people have been killed in an attack on a UN vehicle in Garowe, the capital of Puntland in northeastern Somalia, local security sources told Al Jazeera.

Four UNICEF staff members were among the dead and four other staff members were in a serious condition, the United Nations Children’s Fund said in a statement on Monday.

Abdiwali Hirsi, Puntland’s Information Minister, told Al Jazeera that two other victims were Somali security guards. The seventh victim was yet to be identified.

UNICEF said the attack occurred when the vehicle travelled from a guest house to the UN agency’s office in Garowe in the autonomous Puntland region, adding that the UN was presently contacting families of the staff and airlifting the injured.

The victims were an integral part of UNICEF’s work in Somalia, “dedicated to improving the lives of others”, the statement said.

Al-Shabab claims attack

Addressing the opening session of the forum, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn called for eradicating terrorism and extremism in the African continent.

World Bulletin

The 4th Tana Forum on Security in Africa kicked off Saturday in the western Ethiopian city of Bahar Dar.

Participating in the forum are the leaders of Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Mali, Somalia’s Puntland State, Botswana and South Sudan.

Addressing the opening session of the forum, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn called for eradicating terrorism and extremism in the African continent.

Desalegn added that the participation of the presidents of both Kenya and Mali in the forum for the first time was indicative of the desire of African states to discuss issues important for the stability and security of the African continent.

The Ethiopian PM went on to describe this year’s forum as “crucial,” noting that the event would focus on drawing distinctions between religion and politics.

“A distinction must be drawn between secularism and religion as the matter presents a tough challenge for security,” Desalegn said.

Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo – who headed the forum – described the theme of the forum as timely.

He expressed hopes that the forum would succeed in finding mechanisms for managing tensions between secularism and the politicization of religion in Africa.

Poverty, Obasanjo said, has become the number one threat for peace and security in Africa, despite efforts to place the continent on the path to sustainable development.

The Tana Forum was established in 2009 in line with the Tripoli Declaration issued by the extraordinary African summit, which was held on Aug. 31 of the same year to deal with the conflicts of the continent.

hassan sheikh 2015

 Amman, Jordan

After getting an official invitation from the Kingdom of Urdun, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has attended a forum on countering terrorism, Rbc Reports.

The President has participated this conferrence on counter terrorism which was hosted by Urdun Kingdom. Several International Heads of states have also been invited to attend.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud who departed Mogadadishu on Friday, after returning from Gal-gudud where he launched state formation convention, have been warmly welcomed in Urdun by top Urdu officials.

This conference has reportedly held to discuss best and fastest ways of countering terrorism at the presence of presidents whose countries suffer terrorism.

Somalia, horn African nation wh roots the notorious Al-qaida linked militants Al-shabab has also been sent an official invitation to shares its view on the matter on the table.

Uhuru Mungia Kenya, Kenyan President is also attending the forum as his country struggles to protect bloody terror attacks from its citizens.

Kenya Garissa University Attack 1

 

The full extent of operational and strategic blunders witnessed in response to terrorist attacks, including the Garissa University College killings, can now be revealed.

The Sunday Nation has established, in interviews with a highly-placed security expert, that the soldiers in barracks a few minutes away from Garissa University had the full capability to respond to the April 2 attack and quell it in less than two hours.

Questions also remain unanswered on why operational police and military chiefs in Nairobi and on the ground waited for so long to take decisions that could have saved lives, exposing gaps in how useful information is shared and collated between different security agencies.

“The soldiers there (in Garissa) are highly trained on how to fight in built-up areas. They are trained on how to clear room to room and floor to floor,” said an expert who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of his position in the national security pecking order.

Multiple sources within the military, but who spoke in confidence, indicate that some troops next door to the university had been rigorously trained by American and British special forces, in addition to rigorous training by local instructors.

Why they did not end the siege within the shortest time possible… until a police team was flown in from Nairobi?

Although Interior Cabinet Secretary Joseph Nkaissery and Inspector-General of Police Joseph Boinnet have maintained that the response time was the best in the circumstances, military and security experts have been scathing in their assessment.

“If you look at how we responded, it was not bad at all, say, compared with Westgate. It takes time to assess and make the decisions, escalating it from National Security Advisory Committee to the National Security Council and then to scramble the elite units, get them to the airport and fly them to Garissa, which is a two-hour flight. There were many moving parts and the nine hours it took was reasonable,” Interior Ministry spokesman Mwenda Njoka told the Sunday Nation in the days following the attack.

But it doesn’t appear that way from the eyes of experts who have assessed the response.

“The attack on Garissa University College, which is next door to a military base, is a clear indication of the utter disregard the terrorists have for our security forces. The terrorists took control of the university grounds from 5.30 a.m. up to about 10 p.m. — a total of 16 hours of undisturbed orgy of killing, maiming and shattering of lives. That our security apparatus sees the 16 hours of horror as reasonable time is reason for us to be very worried,” wrote Lt-Col (rtd) Ben Mwarania, a security consultant, in the Sunday Nation last week.

He added that the performance of the security forces in the recent past gives little hope for a better tomorrow.

Another security expert, who spoke on condition of anonymity, wondered why military aircraft were not used to fly police commandos from the General Service Unit Recce Squad to Garissa, to shorten the response time. The expert said the inordinately long time it took to neutralise the attack showed weaknesses in the coordination of information at command levels.

NATIONAL EMERGENCY

He wondered why more equipped and highly trained soldiers had to wait for police commandos to come in from Nairobi and end the siege in what was clearly a national emergency.

Multiple sources within the security apparatus said chunks of useful information are only assessed and analysed at the national level, with senior officers on the ground — from the police, intelligence and military — not having an existing protocol on how to share information or mobilise resources within their reach to respond to emergencies of the Garissa university magnitude.

It has emerged that operational and strategic plans — well written but for long gathering dust in government shelves — may be the sin of omission that has seen terror attacks in the country escalate rather than reduce.

Since KDF launched an incursion into Somalia in October 2011 to fight Al-Shabaab, terror strikes in the country have increased every year.

The Garissa attack in which 148 lives were lost is the worst since the bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi in 1998 by Al-Qaeda.

A cogent plan to help the country counteract the effects of the incursion into Somali was abandoned at a most critical hour, leaving the country vulnerable to sleeper cells that had arrived in Kenya before KDF moved into Somalia.

Under Gen Jeremiah Kianga, a strategy had been mooted to create an integrated plan that would bring KDF, the police, the National Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on board.

Impeccable sources have now told Sunday Nation that a number of meetings were held at military barracks in Embakasi, bringing together senior officers from the four government departments to strategise on how to secure the country once the troops moved into Somalia.

The plan appears to have lived through the initial stages of the incursion into Somalia, evident in the fact that news briefings on the progress made by the troops involved officers from all the four departments.

But the command centre for Operation Linda Nchi would later be moved, under the direction of the KDF senior command, from Embakasi to the Military Command Centre — a highly classified government facility where no civilians are allowed in.

The facility is strictly accessed only by the military and the President — should the need arise — in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.

Shifting of the command centre meant that participation by the police, the NIS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at operational level had automatically ended.

IDENTIFY TARGETS

The plan had been well thought-out, down to the district level across the country where security chiefs would identify possible terrorism targets.

They were then supposed to draw up response plans, complete with how different agencies would synchronise their responses, in case Al-Shabaab retaliated in Kenya.

It meant that, for instance, in the Garissa attack, the police and intelligence chiefs should have established a working formula with the military such that coordination of the response would not have waited for decisions from Nairobi, given the gravity of the matter at hand.

A similar coordination and response method was used to secure the country during the 2013 General Election in what is known in military parlance as “Aid to Civil Authority”.

Over the last December holidays, when intelligence information showed that terrorists could strike, there was high visibility of security forces, including patrols in Nairobi by Prison warders.

The scandal of the gaps that exist today can be traced way back to mid-1990s.

Back then, the government was dealing with rampant cattle rustling, banditry, inter-ethnic and inter-clan clashes that often involved use of heavy weaponry.

These security problems were heightened by a breakdown in command. An Israeli security expert, sources say, was detailed to propose steps the government could take to better secure citizens and property.

Then President Moi appointed a committee to study the report and make recommendations.

One of the key recommendations in the report, but which was never implemented, was the establishment of a Border Patrol Unit of the Police, with semi-military training and detailed to battle cattle rustling, ethnic and tribal clashes and cross-border fights that often break out in the northern half of the country.

“The threshold of the threat to public security now lies between crime and insurgency warfare. It, therefore, requires military or semi military mitigation in both time and effort. Furthermore, the battlefield has moved to highly populated areas and civilians are the main targets,” says a top-level security brief seen by the Sunday Nation.

“The response to mitigate these threats is hindered by weaknesses in the national early warning systems and the operational integrity of the combined forces’ actions …

“Therefore, to exercise military level jurisdiction over this threat under the law, there is a need to restructure the police service to give it capabilities in the form of skills, organisation and equipment corresponding to military effort,” the brief states.

 

2353-150x150

Muqdisho (Bartamaha)Nin aanu wada shaqayn jirnay oo xaas leh ayaa gabdhaha kale telefoonadooda markuu save-garaynayo wuxuu magacyo uga dhigi jiray magacyada hay’adaha si aanay xaaskiisuu fahmin marka ay telefoonkiisa baadh baadhayso.

Telefoonkiisa hadaad eegto waxaa ku jira magacyada hay’adaha dalka jooga oo dhan UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, SAVE THE CHILDREN, IOM, DRC, DDG, HALO TRUST, UNHCR. Wuxuu ku leeyahay maanta dhan haday isoo wacayaan xaaskaygu ma shakido oo waxay moodaa qolooyinkii wada shaqayntu naga dhexeysay.

Mararka qaarkood iyadoo gacanta ku haysa ayuu soo dhacaa markaasay ula soo carartaa isagoo labisanaya oo tidhaahdaa “xabiibi IOM baa ku soo garaacday.” Markaasuu yidhaahdaa keen keen xabiibi waaba iyaga qolada aan caawa shirka kula leeyahay Maansoor Hotel.

” IOM wuxuu u bixin jiray dumarka qurbaha ka yimid.Gabdhaha dabeecadda xun wuxuu u bixin jiray HALO TRUST (hay’adda miinadda). Hablaha yar yar ee suuqa ku cusubna wuxuu u bixin jiray Save the Children.

Waxaan weydiiyey oo tan aad WFP u bixisay maxaad ugu bixisay? Wuxuu yidhi habeen baan Safari Hotel u casho geeyey markaasay dalbatay laba digaag ah iyo baastadoodii oo jibisna la socoto. Intii cashada la soo wadayna waxay isku dhuuqday maraq cashada laga soo horaysiiyey iyo afar midh oo roodhi ah oo kuus kuusan. Markaasay markii cashada la soo dhigayna tidhi “Alla hoogay soo aniga is ilaaway, huuno maad i qabatid maraqa waan necebahaye.

” Wuxuu yidhi habeenka aan raboinaan WFP aroos u raaco ama ay Save the Children house party igu soo casuunto, xaaskayga aroornimada ayaan ku idhaahdaa xabiibi maanta safar shaqo (field) ayaan Save the Children u raacayaa ee cashada ha iigu tala galin waan soo daahayaaye. Ama waxaan odhan jiray WFP raashin ay qaybinayso ayaan kormeer ku soo samaynayaa ee caawa ha i sugine iska seexo. KkkkkKkkkkkkk

Syria

Der Speigel

Aloof. Polite. Cajoling. Extremely attentive. Restrained. Dishonest. Inscrutable. Malicious. The rebels from northern Syria, remembering encounters with him months later, recall completely different facets of the man. But they agree on one thing: “We never knew exactly who we were sitting across from.”

In fact, not even those who shot and killed him after a brief firefight in the town of Tal Rifaat on a January morning in 2014 knew the true identity of the tall man in his late fifties. They were unaware that they had killed the strategic head of the group calling itself “Islamic State” (IS).

The fact that this could have happened at all was the result of a rare but fatal miscalculation by the brilliant planner. The local rebels placed the body into a refrigerator, in which they intended to bury him. Only later, when they realized how important the man was, did they lift his body out again.

Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi was the real name of the Iraqi, whose bony features were softened by a white beard. But no one knew him by that name. Even his best-known pseudonym, Haji Bakr, wasn’t widely known. But that was precisely part of the plan. The former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein’s air defense force had been secretly pulling the strings at IS for years. Former members of the group had repeatedly mentioned him as one of its leading figures. Still, it was never clear what exactly his role was.

But when the architect of the Islamic State died, he left something behind that he had intended to keep strictly confidential: the blueprint for this state. It is a folder full of handwritten organizational charts, lists and schedules, which describe how a country can be gradually subjugated. SPIEGEL has gained exclusive access to the 31 pages, some consisting of several pages pasted together. They reveal a multilayered composition and directives for action, some already tested and others newly devised for the anarchical situation in Syria’s rebel-held territories. In a sense, the documents are the source code of the most successful terrorist army in recent history.

Until now, much of the information about IS has come from fighters who had defected and data sets from the IS internal administration seized in Baghdad. But none of this offered an explanation for the group’s meteoric rise to prominence, before air strikes in the late summer of 2014 put a stop to its triumphal march.

For the first time, the Haji Bakr documents now make it possible to reach conclusions on how the IS leadership is organized and what role former officials in the government of ex-dictator Saddam Hussein play in it. Above all, however, they show how the takeover in northern Syria was planned, making the group’s later advances into Iraq possible in the first place. In addition, months of research undertaken by SPIEGEL in Syria, as well as other newly discovered records, exclusive to SPIEGEL, show that Haji Bakr’s instructions were carried out meticulously.

Bakr’s documents were long hidden in a tiny addition to a house in embattled northern Syria. Reports of their existence were first made by an eyewitness who had seen them in Haji Bakr’s house shortly after his death. In April 2014, a single page from the file was smuggled to Turkey, where SPIEGEL was able to examine it for the first time. It only became possible to reach Tal Rifaat to evaluate the entire set of handwritten papers in November 2014.

“Our greatest concern was that these plans could fall into the wrong hands and would never have become known,” said the man who has been storing Haji Bakr’s notes after pulling them out from under a tall stack of boxes and blankets. The man, fearing the IS death squads, wishes to remain anonymous.

The Master Plan

The story of this collection of documents begins at a time when few had yet heard of the “Islamic State.” When Iraqi national Haji Bakr traveled to Syria as part of a tiny advance party in late 2012, he had a seemingly absurd plan: IS would capture as much territory as possible in Syria. Then, using Syria as a beachhead, it would invade Iraq.

Bakr took up residence in an inconspicuous house in Tal Rifaat, north of Aleppo. The town was a good choice. In the 1980s, many of its residents had gone to work in the Gulf nations, especially Saudi Arabia. When they returned, some brought along radical convictions and contacts. In 2013, Tal Rifaat would become IS’ stronghold in Aleppo Province, with hundreds of fighters stationed there.

It was there that the “Lord of the Shadows,” as some called him, sketched out the structure of the Islamic State, all the way down to the local level, compiled lists relating to the gradual infiltration of villages and determined who would oversee whom. Using a ballpoint pen, he drew the chains of command in the security apparatus on stationery. Though presumably a coincidence, the stationery was from the Syrian Defense Ministry and bore the letterhead of the department in charge of accommodations and furniture.

What Bakr put on paper, page by page, with carefully outlined boxes for individual responsibilities, was nothing less than a blueprint for a takeover. It was not a manifesto of faith, but a technically precise plan for an “Islamic Intelligence State” — a caliphate run by an organization that resembled East Germany’s notorious Stasi domestic intelligence agency.

This blueprint was implemented with astonishing accuracy in the ensuing months. The plan would always begin with the same detail: The group recruited followers under the pretense of opening a Dawah office, an Islamic missionary center. Of those who came to listen to lectures and attend courses on Islamic life, one or two men were selected and instructed to spy on their village and obtain a wide range of information. To that end, Haji Bakr compiled lists such as the following:

  • List the powerful families.
  • Name the powerful individuals in these families.
  • Find out their sources of income.
  • Name names and the sizes of (rebel) brigades in the village.
  • Find out the names of their leaders, who controls the brigades and their political orientation.
  • Find out their illegal activities (according to Sharia law), which could be used to blackmail them if necessary.

The spies were told to note such details as whether someone was a criminal or a homosexual, or was involved in a secret affair, so as to have ammunition for blackmailing later. “We will appoint the smartest ones as Sharia sheiks,” Bakr had noted. “We will train them for a while and then dispatch them.” As a postscript, he had added that several “brothers” would be selected in each town to marry the daughters of the most influential families, in order to “ensure penetration of these families without their knowledge.”

The spies were to find out as much as possible about the target towns: Who lived there, who was in charge, which families were religious, which Islamic school of religious jurisprudence they belonged to, how many mosques there were, who the imam was, how many wives and children he had and how old they were. Other details included what the imam’s sermons were like, whether he was more open to the Sufi, or mystical variant of Islam, whether he sided with the opposition or the regime, and what his position was on jihad. Bakr also wanted answers to questions like: Does the imam earn a salary? If so, who pays it? Who appoints him? Finally: How many people in the village are champions of democracy?

The agents were supposed to function as seismic signal waves, sent out to track down the tiniest cracks, as well as age-old faults within the deep layers of society — in short, any information that could be used to divide and subjugate the local population. The informants included former intelligence spies, but also regime opponents who had quarreled with one of the rebel groups. Some were also young men and adolescents who needed money or found the work exciting. Most of the men on Bakr’s list of informants, such as those from Tal Rifaat, were in their early twenties, but some were as young as 16 or 17.

The plans also include areas like finance, schools, daycare, the media and transportation. But there is a constantly recurring, core theme, which is meticulously addressed in organizational charts and lists of responsibilities and reporting requirements: surveillance, espionage, murder and kidnapping.

For each provincial council, Bakr had planned for an emir, or commander, to be in charge of murders, abductions, snipers, communication and encryption, as well as an emir to supervise the other emirs — “in case they don’t do their jobs well.” The nucleus of this godly state would be the demonic clockwork of a cell and commando structure designed to spread fear.

From the very beginning, the plan was to have the intelligence services operate in parallel, even at the provincial level. A general intelligence department reported to the “security emir” for a region, who was in charge of deputy-emirs for individual districts. A head of secret spy cells and an “intelligence service and information manager” for the district reported to each of these deputy-emirs. The spy cells at the local level reported to the district emir’s deputy. The goal was to have everyone keeping an eye on everyone else.

Those in charge of training the “Sharia judges in intelligence gathering” also reported to the district emir, while a separate department of “security officers” was assigned to the regional emir.

Sharia, the courts, prescribed piety — all of this served a single goal: surveillance and control. Even the word that Bakr used for the conversion of true Muslims, takwin, is not a religious but a technical term that translates as “implementation,” a prosaic word otherwise used in geology or construction. Still, 1,200 years ago, the word followed a unique path to a brief moment of notoriety. Shiite alchemists used it to describe the creation of artificial life. In his ninth century “Book of Stones,” the Persian Jabir Ibn Hayyan wrote — using a secret script and codes — about the creation of a homunculus. “The goal is to deceive all, but those who love God.” That may also have been to the liking of Islamic State strategists, although the group views Shiites as apostates who shun true Islam. But for Haji Bakr, God and the 1,400-year-old faith in him was but one of many modules at his disposal to arrange as he liked for a higher purpose.

The Beginnings in Iraq

It seemed as if George Orwell had been the model for this spawn of paranoid surveillance. But it was much simpler than that. Bakr was merely modifying what he had learned in the past: Saddam Hussein’s omnipresent security apparatus, in which no one, not even generals in the intelligence service, could be certain they weren’t being spied on.

Expatriate Iraqi author Kanan Makiya described this “Republic of Fear” in a book as a country in which anyone could simply disappear and in which Saddam could seal his official inauguration in 1979 by exposing a bogus conspiracy.

There is a simple reason why there is no mention in Bakr’s writings of prophecies relating to the establishment of an Islamic State allegedly ordained by God: He believed that fanatical religious convictions alone were not enough to achieve victory. But he did believe that the faith of others could be exploited.

In 2010, Bakr and a small group of former Iraqi intelligence officers made Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir and later “caliph,” the official leader of the Islamic State. They reasoned that Baghdadi, an educated cleric, would give the group a religious face.

Bakr was “a nationalist, not an Islamist,” says Iraqi journalist Hisham al-Hashimi, as he recalls the former career officer, who was stationed with Hashimi’s cousin at the Habbaniya Air Base. “Colonel Samir,” as Hashimi calls him, “was highly intelligent, firm and an excellent logistician.” But when Paul Bremer, then head of the US occupational authority in Baghdad, “dissolved the army by decree in May 2003, he was bitter and unemployed.”

Thousands of well-trained Sunni officers were robbed of their livelihood with the stroke of a pen. In doing so, America created its most bitter and intelligent enemies. Bakr went underground and met Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Anbar Province in western Iraq. Zarqawi, a Jordanian by birth, had previously run a training camp for international terrorist pilgrims in Afghanistan. Starting in 2003, he gained global notoriety as the mastermind of attacks against the United Nations, US troops and Shiite Muslims. He was even too radical for former Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi died in a US air strike in 2006.

Although Iraq’s dominant Baath Party was secular, the two systems ultimately shared a conviction that control over the masses should lie in the hands of a small elite that should not be answerable to anyone — because it ruled in the name of a grand plan, legitimized by either God or the glory of Arab history. The secret of IS’ success lies in the combination of opposites, the fanatical beliefs of one group and the strategic calculations of the other.

Bakr gradually became one of the military leaders in Iraq, and he was held from 2006 to 2008 in the US military’s Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib Prison. He survived the waves of arrests and killings by American and Iraqi special units, which threatened the very existence of the IS precursor organization in 2010, Islamic State in Iraq.

For Bakr and a number of former high-ranking officers, this presented an opportunity to seize power in a significantly smaller circle of jihadists. They utilized the time they shared in Camp Bucca to establish a large network of contacts. But the top leaders had already known each other for a long time. Haji Bakr and an additional officer were part of the tiny secret-service unit attached to the anti-aircraft division. Two other IS leaders were from a small community of Sunni Turkmen in the town of Tal Afar. One of them was a high-ranking intelligence officer as well.

In 2010, the idea of trying to defeat Iraqi government forces militarily seemed futile. But a powerful underground organization took shape through acts of terror and protection rackets. When the uprising against the dictatorship of the Assad clan erupted in neighboring Syria, the organization’s leaders sensed an opportunity. By late 2012, particularly in the north, the formerly omnipotent government forces had largely been defeated and expelled. Instead, there were now hundreds of local councils and rebel brigades, part of an anarchic mix that no one could keep track of. It was a state of vulnerability that the tightly organized group of ex-officers sought to exploit.

Attempts to explain IS and its rapid rise to power vary depending on who is doing the explaining. Terrorism experts view IS as an al-Qaida offshoot and attribute the absence of spectacular attacks to date to what they view as a lack of organizational capacity. Criminologists see IS as a mafia-like holding company out to maximize profit. Scholars in the humanities point to the apocalyptic statements by the IS media department, its glorification of death and the belief that Islamic State is involved in a holy mission.

But apocalyptic visions alone are not enough to capture cities and take over countries. Terrorists don’t establish countries. And a criminal cartel is unlikely to generate enthusiasm among supporters around the world, who are willing to give up their lives to travel to the “Caliphate” and potentially their deaths.

IS has little in common with predecessors like al-Qaida aside from its jihadist label. There is essentially nothing religious in its actions, its strategic planning, its unscrupulous changing of alliances and its precisely implemented propaganda narratives. Faith, even in its most extreme form, is just one of many means to an end. Islamic State’s only constant maxim is the expansion of power at any price.

The Implementation of the Plan

The expansion of IS began so inconspicuously that, a year later, many Syrians had to think for a moment about when the jihadists had appeared in their midst. The Dawah offices that were opened in many towns in northern Syria in the spring of 2013 were innocent-looking missionary offices, not unlike the ones that Islamic charities have opened worldwide.

When a Dawah office opened in Raqqa, “all they said was that they were ‘brothers,’ and they never said a word about the ‘Islamic State’,” reports a doctor who fled from the city. A Dawah office was also opened in Manbij, a liberal city in Aleppo Province, in the spring of 2013. “I didn’t even notice it at first,” recalls a young civil rights activist. “Anyone was allowed to open what he wished. We would never have suspected that someone other than the regime could threaten us. It was only when the fighting erupted in January that we learned that Da’ish,” the Arab acronym for IS, “had already rented several apartments where it could store weapons and hide its men.”

The situation was similar in the towns of al-Bab, Atarib and Azaz. Dawah offices were also opened in neighboring Idlib Province in early 2013, in the towns of Sermada, Atmeh, Kafr Takharim, al-Dana and Salqin. As soon as it had identified enough “students” who could be recruited as spies, IS expanded its presence. In al-Dana, additional buildings were rented, black flags raised and streets blocked off. In towns where there was too much resistance or it was unable to secure enough supporters, IS chose to withdraw temporarily. At the beginning, its modus operandi was to expand without risking open resistance, and abduct or kill “hostile individuals,” while denying any involvement in these nefarious activities.

The fighters themselves also remained inconspicuous at first. Bakr and the advance guard had not brought them along from Iraq, which would have made sense. In fact, they had explicitly prohibited their Iraqi fighters from going to Syria. They also chose not to recruit very many Syrians. The IS leaders opted for the most complicated option instead: They decided to gather together all the foreign radicals who had been coming to the region since the summer of 2012. Students from Saudi Arabia, office workers from Tunisia and school dropouts from Europe with no military experience were to form an army with battle-tested Chechens and Uzbeks. It would be located in Syria under Iraqi command.

Already by the end of 2012, military camps had been erected in several places. Initially, no one knew what groups they belonged to. The camps were strictly organized and the men there came from numerous countries — and didn’t speak to journalists. Very few of them were from Iraq. Newcomers received two months of training and were drilled to be unconditionally obedient to the central command. The set-up was inconspicuous and also had another advantage: though necessarily chaotic at the beginning, what emerged were absolutely loyal troops. The foreigners knew nobody outside of their comrades, had no reason to show mercy and could be quickly deployed to many different places. This was in stark contrast to the Syrian rebels, who were mostly focused on defending their hometowns and had to look after their families and help out with the harvest. In fall 2013, IS books listed 2,650 foreign fighters in the Province of Aleppo alone. Tunisians represented a third of the total, followed by Saudi Arabians, Turks, Egyptians and, in smaller numbers, Chechens, Europeans and Indonesians.

Later too, the jihadist cadres were hopelessly outnumbered by the Syrian rebels. Although the rebels distrusted the jihadists, they didn’t join forces to challenge IS because they didn’t want to risk opening up a second front. Islamic State, though, increased its clout with a simple trick: The men always appeared wearing black masks, which not only made them look terrifying, but also meant that no one could know how many of them there actually were. When groups of 200 fighters appeared in five different places one after the other, did it mean that IS had 1,000 people? Or 500? Or just a little more than 200? In addition, spies also ensured that IS leadership was constantly informed of where the population was weak or divided or where there were local conflict, allowing IS to offer itself as a protective power in order to gain a foothold.

The Capture of Raqqa

Raqqa, a once sleepy provincial city on the Euphrates River, was to become the prototype of the complete IS conquest. The operation began subtly, gradually became more brutal and, in the end, IS prevailed over larger opponents without much of a fight. “We were never very political,” explained one doctor who had fled Raqqa for Turkey. “We also weren’t religious and didn’t pray much.”

When Raqqa fell to the rebels in March 2013, a city council was rapidly elected. Lawyers, doctors and journalists organized themselves. Women’s groups were established. The Free Youth Assembly was founded, as was the movement “For Our Rights” and dozens of other initiatives. Anything seemed possible in Raqqa. But in the view of some who fled the city, it also marked the start of its downfall.

True to Haji Bakr’s plan, the phase of infiltration was followed by the elimination of every person who might have been a potential leader or opponent. The first person hit was the head of the city council, who was kidnapped in mid-May 2013 by masked men. The next person to disappear was the brother of a prominent novelist. Two days later, the man who had led the group that painted a revolutionary flag on the city walls vanished.

“We had an idea who kidnapped him,” one of his friends explains, “but no one dared any longer to do anything.” The system of fear began to take hold. Starting in July, first dozens and then hundreds of people disappeared. Sometimes their bodies were found, but they usually disappeared without a trace. In August, the IS military leadership dispatched several cars driven by suicide bombers to the headquarters of the FSA brigade, the “Grandsons of the Prophet,” killing dozens of fighters and leading the rest to flee. The other rebels merely looked on. IS leadership had spun a web of secret deals with the brigades so that each thought it was only the others who might be the targets of IS attacks.

On Oct. 17, 2013, Islamic State called all civic leaders, clerics and lawyers in the city to a meeting. At the time, some thought it might be a gesture of conciliation. Of the 300 people who attended the meeting, only two spoke out against the ongoing takeover, the kidnappings and the murders committed by IS.

One of the two was Muhannad Habayebna, a civil rights activist and journalist well known in the city. He was found five days later tied up and executed with a gunshot wound to his head. Friends received an anonymous email with a photo of his body. The message included only one sentence: “Are you sad about your friend now?” Within hours around 20 leading members of the opposition fled to Turkey. The revolution in Raqqa had come to an end.

A short time later, the 14 chiefs of the largest clans gave an oath of allegiance to Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. There’s even a film of the ceremony. They were sheiks with the same clans that had sworn their steadfast loyalty to Syrian President Bashar Assad only two years earlier.

The Death of Haji Bakr

Until the end of 2013, everything was going according to Islamic State’s plan — or at least according to the plan of Haji Bakr. The caliphate was expanding village by village without being confronted by unified resistance from Syrian rebels. Indeed, the rebels seemed paralyzed in the face of IS’ sinister power.

But when IS henchmen brutally tortured a well-liked rebel leader and doctor to death in December 2013, something unexpected happened. Across the country, Syrian brigades — both secular and parts of the radical Nusra Front — joined together to do battle with Islamic State. By attacking IS everywhere at the same time, they were able to rob the Islamists of their tactical advantage — that of being able to rapidly move units to where they were most urgently needed.

Within weeks, IS was pushed out of large regions of northern Syria. Even Raqqa, the Islamic State capital, had almost fallen by the time 1,300 IS fighters arrived from Iraq. But they didn’t simply march into battle. Rather, they employed a trickier approach, recalls the doctor who fled. “In Raqqa, there were so many brigades on the move that nobody knew who exactly the others were. Suddenly, a group in rebel dress began to shoot at the other rebels. They all simply fled.”

A small, simple masquerade had helped IS fighters to victory: Just change out of black clothes into jeans and vests. They did the same thing in the border town of Jarablus. On several occasions, rebels in other locations took drivers from IS suicide vehicles into custody. The drivers asked in surprise: “You are Sunnis too? Our emir told me you were infidels from Assad’s army.”

Once complete, the picture begins to look absurd: God’s self-proclaimed enforcers on Earth head out to conquer a future worldly empire, but with what? With ninja outfits, cheap tricks and espionage cells camouflaged as missionary offices. But it worked. IS held on to Raqqa and was able to reconquer some of its lost territories. But it came too late for the great planner Haji Bakr.

Haji Bakr stayed behind in the small city of Tal Rifaat, where IS had long had the upper hand. But when rebels attacked at the end of January 2014, the city became divided within just a few hours. One half remained under IS control while the other was wrested away by one of the local brigades. Haji Bakr was stuck in the wrong half. Furthermore, in order to remain incognito he had refrained from moving into one of the heavily guarded IS military quarters. And so, the godfather of snitching was snitched on by a neighbor. “A Daish sheik lives next door!” the man called. A local commander named Abdelmalik Hadbe and his men drove over to Bakr’s house. A woman jerked open the door and said brusquely: “My husband isn’t here.”

But his car is parked out front, the rebels countered.

At that moment, Haji Bakr appeared at the door in his pajamas. Hadbe ordered him to come with them, whereupon Bakr protested that he wanted to get dressed. No, Hadbe repeated: “Come with us! Immediately!”

Surprisingly nimbly for his age, Bakr jumped back and kicked the door closed, according to two people who witnessed the scene. He then hid under the stairs and yelled: “I have a suicide belt! I’ll blow up all of us!” He then came out with a Kalashnikov and began shooting. Hadbe then fired his weapon and killed Bakr.

When the men later learned who they had killed, they searched the house, gathering up computers, passports, mobile phone SIM cards, a GPS device and, most importantly, papers. They didn’t find a Koran anywhere.

Haji Bakr was dead and the local rebels took his wife into custody. Later, the rebels exchanged her for Turkish IS hostages at the request of Ankara. Bakr’s valuable papers were initially hidden away in a chamber, where they spent several months.

A Second Cache of Documents

Haji Bakr’s state continued to work even without its creator. Just how precisely his plans were implemented — point by point — is confirmed by the discovery of another file. When IS was forced to rapidly abandon its headquarters in Aleppo in January 2014, they tried to burn their archive, but they ran into a problem similar to that confronted by the East German secret police 25 years earlier: They had too many files.

Some of them remained intact and ended up with the al-Tawhid Brigade, Aleppo’s largest rebel group at the time. After lengthy negotiations, the group agreed to make the papers available to SPIEGEL for exclusive publication rights — everything except a list of IS spies inside of al-Tawhid.

An examination of the hundreds of pages of documents reveals a highly complex system involving the infiltration and surveillance of all groups, including IS’ own people. The jihad archivists maintained long lists noting which informants they had installed in which rebel brigades and government militias. It was even noted who among the rebels was a spy for Assad’s intelligence service.

“They knew more than we did, much more,” said the documents’ custodian. Personnel files of the fighters were among them, including detailed letters of application from incoming foreigners, such as the Jordanian Nidal Abu Eysch. He sent along all of his terror references, including their telephone numbers, and the file number of a felony case against him. His hobbies were also listed: hunting, boxing, bomb building.

IS wanted to know everything, but at the same time, the group wanted to deceive everyone about its true aims. One multiple-page report, for example, carefully lists all of the pretexts IS could use to justify the seizure of the largest flour mill in northern Syria. It includes such excuses as alleged embezzlement as well as the ungodly behavior of the mill’s workers. The reality — that all strategically important facilities like industrial bakeries, grain silos and generators were to be seized and their equipment sent to the caliphate’s unofficial capital Raqqa — was to be kept under wraps.

Over and over again, the documents reveal corollaries with Haji Bakr’s plans for the establishment of IS — for example that marrying in to influential families should be pushed. The files from Aleppo also included a list of 34 fighters who wanted wives in addition to other domestic needs. Abu Luqman and Abu Yahya al-Tunis, for example, noted that they needed an apartment. Abu Suheib and Abu Ahmed Osama requested bedroom furniture. Abu al-Baraa al Dimaschqi asked for financial assistance in addition to a complete set of furniture, while Abu Azmi wanted a fully automatic washing machine.

Shifting Alliances

But in the first months of 2014, yet another legacy from Haji Bakr began playing a decisive role: His decade of contacts to Assad’s intelligence services.

In 2003, the Damascus regime was panicked that then-US President George W. Bush, after his victory over Saddam Hussein, would have his troops continue into Syria to topple Assad as well. Thus, in the ensuing years, Syrian intelligence officials organized the transfer of thousands of radicals from Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia to al-Qaida in Iraq. Ninety percent of the suicide attackers entered Iraq via the Syrian route. A strange relationship developed between Syrian generals, international jihadists and former Iraqi officers who had been loyal to Saddam — a joint venture of deadly enemies, who met repeatedly to the west of Damascus.

At the time, the primary aim was to make the lives of the Americans in Iraq hell. Ten years later, Bashar Assad had a different motive to breathe new life into the alliance: He wanted to sell himself to the world as the lesser of several evils. Islamist terror, the more gruesome the better, was too important to leave it up to the terrorists. The regime’s relationship with Islamic State is — just as it was to its predecessor a decade prior — marked by a completely tactical pragmatism. Both sides are trying to use the other in the assumption that it will emerge as the stronger power, able to defeat the discrete collaborator of yesterday. Conversely, IS leaders had no problem receiving assistance from Assad’s air force, despite all of the group’s pledges to annihilate the apostate Shiites. Starting in January 2014, Syrian jets would regularly — and exclusively — bomb rebel positions and headquarters during battles between IS and rebel groups.

In battles between IS and rebels in January 2014, Assad’s jets regularly bombed only rebel positions, while the Islamic State emir ordered his fighters to refrain from shooting at the army. It was an arrangement that left many of the foreign fighters deeply disillusioned; they had imaged jihad differently.

IS threw its entire arsenal at the rebels, sending more suicide bombers into their ranks in just a few weeks than it deployed during the entire previous year against the Syrian army. Thanks in part to additional air strikes, IS was able to reconquer territory that it had briefly lost.

Nothing symbolizes the tactical shifting of alliances more than the fate of the Syrian army’s Division 17. The isolated base near Raqqa had been under rebel siege for more than a year. But then, IS units defeated the rebels there and Assad’s air force was once again able to use the base for supply flights without fear of attack.

But a half year later, after IS conquered Mosul and took control of a gigantic weapons depot there, the jihadists felt powerful enough to attack their erstwhile helpers. IS fighters overran Division 17 and slaughtered the soldiers, whom they had only recently protected.

What the Future May Hold

The setbacks suffered by IS in recent months — the defeat in the fight for Kurdish enclave Kobani and, more recently, the loss of the Iraqi city of Tikrit, have generated the impression that the end of Islamic State is nigh. As though it, in its megalomania, overreached itself, has lost its mystique, is in retreat and will soon disappear. But such forced optimism is likely premature. The IS may have lost many fighters, but it has continued expanding in Syria.

It is true that jihadist experiments in ruling a specific geographical area have failed in the past. Mostly, though, that was because of their lack of knowledge regarding how to administer a region, or even a state. That is exactly the weakness that IS strategists have long been aware of — and eliminated. Within the “Caliphate,” those in power have constructed a regime that is more stable and more flexible than it appears from the outside.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi may be the officially named leader, but it remains unclear how much power he holds. In any case, when an emissary of al-Qaida head Ayman al-Zawahiri contacted the Islamic State, it was Haji Bakr and other intelligence officers, and not al-Baghdadi, whom he approached. Afterwards, the emissary bemoaned “these phony snakes who are betraying the real jihad.”

Within IS, there are state structures, bureaucracy and authorities. But there is also a parallel command structure: elite units next to normal troops; additional commanders alongside nominal military head Omar al-Shishani; power brokers who transfer or demote provincial and town emirs or even make them disappear at will. Furthermore, decisions are not, as a rule, made in Shura Councils, nominally the highest decision-making body. Instead, they are being made by the “people who loosen and bind” (ahl al-hall wa-l-aqd), a clandestine circle whose name is taken from the Islam of medieval times.

Islamic State is able to recognize all manner of internal revolts and stifle them. At the same time, the hermitic surveillance structure is also useful for the financial exploitation of its subjects.

The air strikes flown by the US-led coalition may have destroyed the oil wells and refineries. But nobody is preventing the Caliphate’s financial authorities from wringing money out of the millions of people who live in the regions under IS control — in the form of new taxes and fees, or simply by confiscating property. IS, after all, knows everything from its spies and from the data it plundered from banks, land-registry offices and money-changing offices. It knows who owns which homes and which fields; it knows who owns many sheep or has lots of money. The subjects may be unhappy, but there is minimal room for them to organize, arm themselves and rebel.

As the West’s attention is primarily focused on the possibility of terrorist attacks, a different scenario has been underestimated: the approaching intra-Muslim war between Shiites and Sunnis. Such a conflict would allow IS to graduate from being a hated terror organization to a central power.

Already today, the frontlines in Syria, Iraq and Yemen follow this confessional line, with Shiite Afghans fighting against Sunni Afghans in Syria and IS profiting in Iraq from the barbarism of brutal Shiite militias. Should this ancient Islam conflict continue to escalate, it could spill over into confessionally mixed states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Lebanon.

In such a case, IS propaganda about the approaching apocalypse could become a reality. In its slipstream, an absolutist dictatorship in the name of God could be established.

Somalia Map Bay

NYT

Gunmen from the Shabab, a Somali Islamist group, killed a regional lawmaker on Saturday in the capital, Mogadishu, the group and officials said. The lawmaker, Aden Haji Hussein, a legislator from the semiautonomous Puntland region, was shot outside a hospital where he had taken his wife, witnesses and a police officer said. Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, the Shabab’s spokesman for military affairs, said Shabab gunmen carried out the attack. “We shall continue killing the enemies,” he said by telephone. The group was driven out of the capital in 2011. But it still carries out attacks in Somalia, and has struck across the border in Kenya, including an attack this month at a university in northeast Kenya that left more than 140 people dead.

 

spice-mobile-4-150x150

Muqdisho (Bartamaha)Waxa ay noqotay mid kamid ah waxyaabaha dunida sida aadka ah loola yaabo kadib markii ay dhacday dhacdo ay si aad ah dadka ku dhaqan Degmada Yaaqshid ay u hadal hayaan .

Dhacdadan ayaa waxa ay aheyd in mid kamid ah Qooysaska ku nool degmadaasi ay ku kala tageen Mobile.

Dhacdada ayaa waxaa Warbaahinta Bartamaha.com u xaqeejisay mid kamid ah Gabdhaha iyadu daras la ah qooyska uu falkan naxdinta leh ka dhex dhacay.

Gabadha Ayaa magaceeda noogu soo gaabisay Shankaroon waxa ayna sheegtay in mar qura ay ku soo baxeen buuq iyo sawaxan ka socda guriga qooyska.

Shankaroon ayaa sheegtay in qudheeda ay gudaha guriga gashay xiliga ay galeeysay ayaa waxa ay la kulantay Farxiyo oo iyadu ah hooyada qooyska oo dharkeeda aroorsaneeysa waxa ay weeydiisay waxa dhacay waxa ay u sheegtay in la furay.

Shankaroon waxa ay sheegtay in ay aad u naxday iyada oo arga gaxsana ay wiilkii weeydiisay waxa dhacay isga oo xanaaqsan ayuu ku yiri Shankaroon Abaayo iska dhaaf naagtaan furiin ayeey rabtay.

Shankaroon iyada oo yaaban ayeey ka codsatay in 2 dooda ay sheeydaanka iska naaraan laakiin Farxiyo ayaa u sheegtay in aanay meeshaasi waxba yaalin oo iyada la dalaaqay.

Waxaan saguutis uga dhaqaaqay Farxiyo bay tiri Shankaroon aniga oo alaabta yar u qaaday oo Bajaajna u saaray.

Aniga oo ka xun bay tiri waxa guriga ka dhacay ayaan dib ugu soo laabtay Bashiir oo ah ninka xaaskiisa Furay isga oo careeysan ayaan dib guriga ugu soo laabtay kadib ayaan la sheegeeystay oo aan wax ka weeydiiyay waxa dhacay .

Bashiir ayaa ii sheegay in Farxiyo ay dooneeyso Furiin , Furiinkiina ay heshay oo Sabab ayeey weeydiisay Shankaroon , waxa uu yiri waxaan shalay soo gatay Mobile Qaali ah Farxiyo waxa ay itiri isii waxaan ku dhahay abaayo internet ayaan usoo gatay in aan ka isticmaalo .

Waa ay iga diiday anigana waxaan ku dhahay iga tag aniga ayaa soo gatay Mobile-kan kumana siinayo kuleetiga ayeey igu dhagtay waxa ayna itir ifur waan ka diiday dhowr jeer waxaan ogaaday in aanay aqbaleeynin hadalkeeyga iyo sir sirkeeyga anigana halkaas ayaan ku dalaaqay.

Cajiib………… Cajiib……………….. Cajiin ………………………….

By:-Mohammed Abdullahi Omar

islam

Time

The author Ayaan Hirsi Ali has called for an Islamic reformation. Her new best-seller Heretic proposes five ways that Muslims need to change their faith so that it sits neatly with her notion of modernity.

In a book that reads like a home-made intellectual bomb – a cobbling together of the most vicious examples from Muslim societies – she argues, among other things, that Muslims should rethink the status of Muhammad as infallible and question whether the Quran is truly the word of God.

That’s not going to happen, not in a faith whose bedrock creed is that ‘There is no god but God, and Muhammad is his Messenger.” Muslims revere the Quran as the word of God, as revealed to their beloved Prophet Muhammed in 7th century Arabia. To demand that Muslims question the Quran as divine or the prophet as the perfect human is just not unthinkable for the vast majority of believing Muslims.

It’s also an evisceration of Islam’s fundamental principles, akin to taking a giant eraser to the bits about justice and liberty in the preamble to the American Constitution. As such, Hirsi’s proposal is not so much a proposal as an imperial decree, a tone-deaf declaration rather than an opening of a conversation.

Hirsi’s proposal for a reformation may be a non-starter, but that’s not to say that there’s no hope for a reformation – or rather, given mainstream majority Islam’s lack of a centralized structure – for reformations. Indeed, change is afoot, not just from radical outliers and dissidents, but from Muslims working inside the mainstream tradition. Across the world, Islamic scholars are going back to the texts, peeling off the medieval interpretations that have hardened into truths, and searching for their own answers in the Quran and the Hadith.

As every generation of Muslims has done since the 7th century, modern Muslims are seeking to interpret the spirit of the divine text in light of the mundane realities of its followers. The difference today are the effects of large-scale Muslim migration to the West and modern technology. Education, mobility, and access to information have lead to opportunities of new interpretive freedoms, sped up by the breakdown of the stature of the traditional Islamic authorities. This process cuts both ways: It has made it easy for the Kansan teenager wondering about whether Islam allows her to write her own marriage contract (it does), and it’s also made it easy for fundamentalists to spread a message of intolerance. The same historical disruptions that have produced the horrors of Al Qaeda and ISIL have also produced increasingly confident Muslim activists and scholars, who are working to square their understandings of the Quran’s divine message with universal human-rights norms.

Unlike bombs or beheadings, these gentle disruptions don’t make the news. Earlier this year, the conservative scholar Mohammad Akram Nadwi reversed his acceptance of child marriage – a practice generally allowed in medieval Islamic jurisprudence – after two of his female students told him of the ways they’d seen the practice ruin girls’ lives. He also found a fatwa from an 8th-century scholar denouncing the practice. In other words, he found ways to change his understanding of his faith from within.

Too often, non-Muslims and Muslims alike don’t know enough about Islam to see how flexible Islamic laws can be. Like the violent extremists she rightly opposes, Hirsi takes the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad’s example to be an unbending set of rules and Islam to be “the most rigid religion in the world.” However, its flexibility was one of the reasons it could spread so effectively from Arabia through Asia and Africa, allowing local practices to remain as long as they didn’t contravene its basic tenets.

How could Islam be a rigid set of one-size-fits-all edicts, as the zealots claim, when it’s a faith with followers who range from dreadlocked Oakland grandmas to Hyderabadi mystics to French businessmen? How could it be rigid when interpretations range so widely, running the gamut from bans on women driving (see Saudi Arabia) to giving women the right to lead countries (see Pakistan and Bangladesh)? Such is the decentralized nature of Islam’s majority Sunni sect, which lacks an organized clergy, that it allows followers to go from scholar to scholar until they find an opinion that matches their own.

To reform, Islamic societies needs more Islamic education, not less. The Prophet Muhammad warned his followers against blind faith. A famous anecdote tells of him coming across an Arab nomad walking away from his camel, having neglected to tie it up. When he asked the man why he didn’t secure the beast, the man said, “I put my trust in Allah.” Muhammad’s answer was pithy: “Tie your camel first – then put your trust in Allah.”

images

Muqdisho (Bartamaha)Sanad Waliba Wax Baa Masraxa Fuullo  oo la Hadal’hayaa Inkastoo Tani ay Soo Jiri Jirtay Hadana Sababo Badan oo is biirsaday ayaa  baaxad u yeelay oo  Baaqa iyo beesa socodka aan jaceylka waafaqsaneyn Badshay

Dumurka  Hadda Jira ayaa Waxa ay ka Wadda Siman yihiin inkastoo aan la oran Karin waa gadigood hadana heesu waa tii la qaaday oo Qaandadu Sidii ay noqotaba waa ay kugu soo sarayaan

Wiil Dhalinyarao ah oo Kolkaasi Wattay Buugaagta Dugsiga sare Midka Ugu Danbey(From Four’ka) ayaa Maalin Gaari B.l ah Waxaa uu Igala soo Raacay Isgoys  Aad ayuu markaasi u Indha Liitay Waxuuna u Egkaa Ruux Diiqeysan  Kursga Danbe Ee Raaxeeyaha loo Yaqaan Ayaan Labadeeyna Gaariga Ka Saaranahay ‘

Yara ayaan kusoo Dhawaaday Markaasi ayaan Dhahay ,Haye’Saaxiib ii Waran ma Xanuunsaneeysaaa Misa ‘’

Kor Ayuu II Fiiriyay Maya ayuu igu Dhahay Kolkaasi  ayaan ‘Iri Haye Yaa Kaasoo Careysiiyay

Saaxiib iskaDhaaf ayuu igu dhahay ,Kama Yeelin Ee Waan Ku eliyay Guntii Waxa Jira Waa uu ii sheegay

Waxaa Yiri Qof ayaan Jeclahay Hadda Waxaa ay Joogtaa Xaafadeeda Waxaa ay igu Dhahday 5$ iisoo  tuur Waxaan Dhahay Ma haayo ,Mar Danbo ha isoo Wicin ayey I dhahday Telphone,ka Waa iga Qaban Ladahay  ,Waxaan Ku Iri Haddii loo Tuuro Sideey Noqonee ‘’Waxuu Yiri  Farxad ayey Ila Jillee ,Waxaan Ari Hadde Taasi kuma Jeclo Lacag Beey Jeceshahaye Nin Yahow Maad Go’aan ka Qaadatid waxuu Yiri Waan Jeclahay ,, Lacag’na Ma Heeyso Arday ayaan Ahay Waxaan Weydiiyay Iyadu Ma Xey Qabbataa Waxuu,Iskuul Hebel ayey Dhigataa,,Mar Haddii ay Faraxadiisu Lacag La Bixiyo ku Jirno Anne Aan Kolkaasi Yar ka Jeeb Roonaa waxaan isku Dayay in aan Qarashkaasi ka Bixiyo,Waan Ka Baxshay ,,,Waxaasa Iiga sii Yaab Badnaa Markii Loo tuuray  Lacagtii Daqiiqad ka Dib Waxaa ay soo Dirtay ‘Fariin ay Ku Leedahay Aad baad u Mahad San tahay Macaane ,,Waan ku Jeclahay ‘’Meyay Jaceylku Lacag ayey Jeceshahaye,,

Xaajadda Dumur Ee Waqtigaani halkaasi ayey Mareeysaa  Mid Waliba Tii ayey ka Daran tahay  Daacad Dumar Lagu Yiqiin Meyay ,,Dumar Waa Na Dhalleen,Balse Sidaani mayna ahaan Jirin Ee Wax Waliba Waa ay is Bedeleen Alaasa OG Amuurta’’

Sababaha keentay iisoo tuur

1 doobabka oo Gedigood aan Shaqeyn

2 Qofka oo arday ah

3 waaridka uu la nool yahay oo aan u ogoleyn in uu telephone kaar ugu shubo

4 Ambila Qabsi oo ay qofku Caadi ka dhigatay

Waxaa kale oo yaab ah Qofka Dumarka ah Waxaaba la leeyahay Haddii uu Baabkaaga Bixin Waayo amaba uu Doonaayo in uu ku irdeeyo Waxaa uu ku Weeydiinayaa Qarash Kolkaasi oo haddii aad Baqiil tahay ama aad ka Maadadto Wax keen Daaqada kaa Saareyso Waana siddii ay Rabtay

Waxaa sii dheer Taas in ay Jiraan dumur ku Tashto Jeebka Nimanka kuwaasi oo aan  Mar’naba Arinkaasi Ceeb u arag Balse waa Sharaf dil Qayaxan

Waanno,,

Ka Soo Qaad Walaalkaa Kaa weyn Amaba Kaa Yar ayaan ahay  Waxaan kuusoo Jeedinayaa Walaasha aan la Hadlaayey  in Aaad ilaashato Sharaftaada ,Dumur’na Kaliya Waxaa uu Sumcad iyo Ciso ku Lee yahay Waa Sharaf Lagu Daray Dhowr Sanan

La Talin Rag

Waxaa Hora loo Yidhi  Gaf Nin Galay Waa Laga Gudaa  Goorteey ahaa’taba,Waxaan ulla Jeedda Haddii ay Xaaskaaga Kolkaasi aad wax Siineyso Tahay Waa siddii La Rabay Hase’yeeshee Waxaa Jirra  Rag Kuwa Xila Hoodda ah Aaan Wax’ba Siin Si Xun Wax u Raadisna  ku Dhoobo Taasi waa Laga Wanaagsan yahay  iskana Ilaali oo Yaana Xoolahaaga Aaqiro Lagugu Cadaabin ‘’

Waxaan kusoo Koobayaa Macalinkeygii Xisaabta ayaa Waxaa uu Dhihi Jiray Xaji Xisaabta Xilahaagana sii ‘’’

Waa   Qormaddii Maxamed Cabdullaahi Cumar

Wiire1994@gmail.com ama

Tell:-0616705258

 

Sign In

Register

Reset Your Password

Email Newsletter

cccc